Potential Game of Multi-Class, Multi-Criteria Traffic Assignment and Congestion Pricing
YU Xiaojun(1), HUANG Haijun(2)
Author information+
(1)School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 100191; School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou College of Finance and Economics, 550004;(2)School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 100191
Managers of a transportation network don't know the utilities of road users when resolving the urban traffic and they have a limited ability to observe road users' path choice behavior. In this paper, the potential game theory is used to study the evolution of multi-criteria traffic assignment with multiple user classes. An admissible dynamic, i.e., a specific evolutionary dynamic which models the behavior as a myopic adjustment process of switching paths for current utility improvement, in the case of either fixed demand or elastic demand, is derived. It is shown that the corresponding traffic assignment is the Nash equilibrium of a potential game if both link travel time function and inverse demand function are strictly monotonic, continuous and differentiable. Furthermore, a variable congestion pricing is given, which can drive the multi-class multi-criteria traffic assignment at current system status to be optimal.
YU Xiaojun
, HUANG Haijun. , {{custom_author.name_en}}.
Potential Game of Multi-Class, Multi-Criteria Traffic Assignment and Congestion Pricing. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2010, 30(8): 1070-1080 https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms09245
PDF(466 KB)
