对于由制造商,分销商和零售商所构成的二层渠道三级供应链利润分配问题,
在供应链正常及中断两种情况下构建了基于Stackelberg的利润独立分配模型和企业合作时的利润分配模型,
进行了博弈分析并比较了不同分配策略对供应链节点企业利润及总利润的影响. 结果表明, 无论供应链有无中断,
供应链节点企业间合作时的总利润要明显高于独立决策时节点企业的总利润. 供应链中断引起需求增加时,
制造商是否在原有基础上扩大生产取决于$m$与$\beta c_{11}$大小的比较; 需求减少时, 制造商是否在原有基础上对
原生产计划和价格进行调整取决于$m$与$\beta c_1$大小的比较; 无论是需求增加还是需求减少,
合作时市场容量变动量$m$对$\beta c_{11}$(或$\beta c_1$)的依赖程度均远低于独立决策的情况.
在供应链中断利润独立分配优化策略中, 提高(或降低)的价格分配份额的大小取决于决策顺序.
供应链节点企业可以通过讨价还价能力的大小来选择适当的分配因子进行利润分配. 通过引入Shapley值法及其算例,
进一步证明了供应链节点企业间的合作能有效提高利润水平, 并保证供应链利润分配的合理性与有效性.

In terms of the profit distribution related to two-stage channels
and three-stage supply chain including manufacturers, distributors and
retailers, this paper compares the effects of different distribution
strategies on profits and gross profits of enterprises at supply chain
nodes through game analysis in normal and interrupted supply chain, on
the basis of Stackelberg's profit independent distribution model and the profit
distribution model in corporate collaboration. It follows that, when
enterprises at supply chain nodes collaborate, the gross profits are significantly
higher than those when enterprises make independent decisions, regardless of supply
chain interruption. When supply chain interruption results in a rise in demand,
for manufacturers, increasing the original production depends on the comparison between
$m$ and $\beta c_{11}$; when the demand shrinks, the readjustment of the
original production plans and of prices depends on the comparison between $m$ and $\beta c_1$.
 In the profit
independent distribution strategy in supply chain interruption,
the regulation of the price distribution quotient  depends
on the decision sequence. Enterprises at supply chain nodes could
select appropriate distribution factors to distribute profits in terms of bargaining
capacity. By the Shapley value and its calculation, it is shown
that the collaboration of enterprises at supply chain nodes can increase profits effectively,
ensuring the rationality and effectiveness of supply chain profit distribution.