针对由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的闭环供应链,利用奖惩契约来协调非集
成模式下的供应链产品订购和回收问题.理论分析结果表明: 在满足一定的条件下奖惩契约
可以实现闭环供应链的协调.合适的奖惩因子能够降低零售商的批发价格, 提高新产品的订
购量和废旧产品回收量.最后通过数值算例验证了奖惩契约的有效性,并对回收产品废弃率和销售价格进行了灵敏度分析.

This paper investigates the ordering and recycling coordination of a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and
 a single retail by the rewards and punishment contract. The theoretical analysis results show that the rewards and punishment contract can coordinate
 the closed-loop supply chain under a certain condition. An appropriate rewards and punishment factor can reduce wholesale price. Order quantity and
  collection will also be enhanced effectively. The numerical examples validate the effectiveness of the reward and punishment contract.
  The sensitivity analysis of the recycling of waste products' abandoned rate and the sales price are presented at last.