激励中测评行为对绩效的影响研究

龚其国, 杨羽茹, 汪寿阳

系统科学与数学 ›› 2011, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (10) : 1288-1296.

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PDF(432 KB)
系统科学与数学 ›› 2011, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (10) : 1288-1296. DOI: 10.12341/jssms11708
论文

激励中测评行为对绩效的影响研究

    龚其国, 杨羽茹, 汪寿阳
作者信息 +

THE EFFECTS OF MANAGER'S MEASUREMENT ON AGENT'S  PERFORMANCE

    GONG Qiguo, YANG Yuru, WANG Shouyang
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摘要

绩效评估一直是激励设计的核心问题, 直接决定激励的强度与有效性.
绩效评估是否有效取决于评估指标与真实产出的一致性或扭曲程度,
对企业有价值的绩效指标能够尽可能反映被评估行为的最大价值.
 在``多任务"代理理论的框架下,将测评指标内生为管理者的行为,构造了三级激励结构,
讨论了管理者测评行为的努力对激励强度、被测行为等的影响.该激励模型可用于供应链上的激励机制分析.

Abstract

Performance measurement is an essential part of the design of any  incentive system. The strength and value of incentive in firms are strongly
 affected by the performance measures available.  Whether performance measures are valuable depends on their distortion
  to output and valuable performance measures should be in great consistency  with the maximum value of actions. In this paper, we use a multi-task model to develop a three-party characterization of incentive and show how the efforts exerted by manager to improve performance measurement affect the strengths of incentive and optimal choices. This model is also applied to supply chain incentive.

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龚其国 , 杨羽茹 , 汪寿阳. 激励中测评行为对绩效的影响研究. 系统科学与数学, 2011, 31(10): 1288-1296. https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms11708
GONG Qi-Guo , YANG Yu-Ru , WANG Shou-Yang. THE EFFECTS OF MANAGER'S MEASUREMENT ON AGENT'S  PERFORMANCE. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2011, 31(10): 1288-1296 https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms11708
中图分类号: 91E45   
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