摘要
研究了在包含一个供应商和两个零售商的供应链中的广告博弈协调问题. 将该问题构造为一个两层次的博弈:供应商与零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈以及零售商之间的合作博弈. 供应商作为整个供应链上的主导者, 拥有产品批发价和零售价的决策权, 而零售商则通过在当地市场上的广告促销投入来影响需求, 进而影响整个供应链的收益. 研究发现,供应商可以通过简单地设定适当的批发价来影响零售商的广告促销投入, 从而使得整个供应链实现最大收益.
Abstract
We consider a two stage advertising game in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, in which the manufacturer sells its goods through the two retailers in a local market. The manufacturer plays a dominant role in the supply chain, and deicides the wholesale price and retail price.
The retailers can influence the profits for the supply chain through advertising and promotion in the local market. The analysis shows that by setting the wholesale price to the level of marginal cost, the manufacturer canmake the supply chain to maximize the profits.
关键词
广告博弈 /
供应链协调 /
批发价协调 /
Stackelberg博弈 /
合作博弈
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Key words
Advertising game, supply chain coordination, wholesale price coordination, /
Stackelberg game, cooperation game
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肖成勇,王谦.
两层次广告博弈中供应商的一种]批发价协调策略. 系统科学与数学, 2011, 31(11): 1504-1510. https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms11746
XIAO Chengyong, WANG Qian.
ONE WHOLESALE PRICE COORDINATING STRATEGY FOR THE MANUFACTURER IN A TWO-STAGE ADVERTISING GAME. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2011, 31(11): 1504-1510 https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms11746
中图分类号:
90B60
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