In this paper, the problem to solve completely mixed Nash equilibria in a general 0-1 strategy game is changed as the problem to solve a system of high degree algebraic equations whose roots are positive and pure decimals. As a special and important case, the problem to solve completely mixed Nash equilibria in a symmetrical 0-1 game is changed as the problem to solve a high degree algebraic equation whose roots are positive and pure decimals by Pascal matrix, Newtonian matrix (a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are Newtonian binomial coefficients), and Pascal-Newtonianmatrix (product of Pascalmatrix and converse of Newtonian matrix). The method of solving converse of the second problem that family of 0-1 symmetrical games is solved by their common completely mixed Nash equilibrium is also given. At the end of the paper, the some examples are given.
JIANG Dianyu.
ALGEBRAIC SOLUTIONS TO COMPLETELY MIXED NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A 0-1 GAME. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2012, 32(2): 161-171 https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms11819