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基于顾客策略行为的两周期供应链动态定价, 契约协调与利润分配机制

张新鑫,申成霖,侯文华   

  1. 天津理工大学管理学院,天津 300384;南开大学商学院,天津 300071
  • 出版日期:2016-02-25 发布日期:2016-03-10

张新鑫,申成霖,侯文华. 基于顾客策略行为的两周期供应链动态定价, 契约协调与利润分配机制[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2016, 36(2): 183-.

ZHANG Xinxin,SHEN Chenglin,HOU Wenhua. DYNAMIC PRICING, COORDINATION AND PROFIT ALLOCATION OF A TWO-PERIOD SUPPLY CHAIN UNDER STRATEGIC CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2016, 36(2): 183-.

DYNAMIC PRICING, COORDINATION AND PROFIT ALLOCATION OF A TWO-PERIOD SUPPLY CHAIN UNDER STRATEGIC CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR

ZHANG Xinxin,SHEN Chenglin,HOU Wenhua   

  1. School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384; School of Business, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071
  • Online:2016-02-25 Published:2016-03-10

构建考虑顾客策略行为的两周期供应链博弈模型, 分析分散式和集中式决策下, 供应链成员的最优决策及顾客策略行为强度对各成员企业决策和利润的影响, 研究两部定价契约和数量折扣契约的协调问题, 提出一个基于成员议价能 力的利润分配机制, 并探讨顾客策略行为和成员议价能力对最优补偿金额的影响. 主要结论为: 1)~顾客策略性越强, 对供应链成员和总利润的负效应越大, 且存在一个阈值, 超过此阈值后, 供应链各成员利润和总利润均降至最低限, 但供应商利润总是高于零售商; 2)~两部定价契约和数量折扣契约能实现上述供应链的协调, 但总有一参与方独 占整个供应链的利润; 3)~基于成员议价能力的利润分配机制下, 最优补偿金额与补偿提供方的议价能力负相关, 顾客策略行为将导致补偿金额的降低.

In the two-stage game framework, we study optimal decisions of two-period supply chain members, impacts of strategic customer behavior on decisions and profits of supply chain members, as well as coordination and profit allocation mechanisms of classical two-part tariff contract and quantity discount contract. Besides, a profit allocation mechanism based on each member's bargain power is proposed. Lastly, impacts of strategic customer behavior and members' bargain power on the optimal amount of compensation are explored. The results show that: 1) Strategic consumer behavior plays a negative role in profits of supply chain members. There exists a threshold, if the strategic customer behavior level is higher than such threshold, profits of each member and supply chain system will decline to the minimum value, but profit of supplier is always higher than that of retailer; 2) The above supply chain can be coordinated under two-part tariff contract and quantity discount contract but one member always gained the whole profit; 3) Under the profit allocation based on each member's bargain power, optimal account of compensation is negatively correlated to the provider, and strategic customer behavior can decrease the account of compensation.

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