研究了企业联盟的盟员企业对联盟同时有一定的参与度和一定的非参与度情况下的利益分配问题, 盟员企业在合作之前完全清楚地知道不同的合作策略所产生的预期收益, 指出该类问题的实质是具有直觉模糊联盟的合作对策的求解问题. 利用直觉模糊集、 Choquet 积分、 连续有序加权平均算子等理论方法, 提出了直觉模糊联盟合作对策的~Shapley 值求解方法, 证明了定义的~Shapley 值能够满足类似经典~Shapley 值的三条公理, 并将其应用于具有直觉模糊联盟的合作企业利益博弈分配中.

This paper studies the profit allocation in the situation that the partners have a degree of membership and a degree of non-membership of enterprise coalitions, assuming that at the very beginning of the games, the players know exactly the excepted profit. This problem can be viewed as cooperative games with intuitionistic fuzzy coalitions. This paper introduces Shapley values of cooperative games with intuitionistic fuzzy coalition, taking use of intuitionistic fuzzy set theory, Choquet integrals and continuous ordered weighted average operator. It is also proven that the defined Shapley values satisfy three axioms for Shapley values of the classical cooperative games. Then we apply the defined Shapley values to solve the problem of profit allocation in intuitionistic fuzzy enterprise coalition.