基于主从博弈的碳排放税制定方法

梁易乐,黄少伟,张星,田芳,魏韡,刘峰,梅生伟

系统科学与数学 ›› 2016, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (8) : 1055-1067.

PDF(599 KB)
PDF(599 KB)
系统科学与数学 ›› 2016, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (8) : 1055-1067. DOI: 10.12341/jssms12848
论文

基于主从博弈的碳排放税制定方法

    梁易乐1,黄少伟1,张星2,田芳2,魏韡3,刘峰3,梅生伟3
作者信息 +

TAXING STRATEGIES FOR CARBON EMISSIONS BASED ON STACKELBERG GAME

    LIANG Yile1 ,HUANG Shaowei1 ,ZHANG Xing 2, TIAN Fang 2,WEI Wei3 ,LIU Feng 3,MEI Shengwei3
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

提出了一种基于主从博弈的碳排放税制定方法, 可同时兼顾节能减排目标与电网企业经济利益,为制定相关政策提供参考. 该主从博弈的上层决策者是政府机构,旨在制定最优税率方案,以最少的税收将系统的碳排放量限制在容许范围内,下层决策者是电网企业, 旨在以最低的发电成本满足系统负荷需求.上述主从博弈可进一步转化为混合整数线性规划问题,并通过CPLEX进行求解. 10机系统算例表明了所提模型与方法的合理性与有效性.

Abstract

This paper presents a method to determine carbon tax on different generating units based on Stackelberg game, which can strike a balance between carbon emission reduction and the profit of energy industry. The upper-level decision maker is the government agency who aims to limit total carbon emissions within a certain level with minimal additional cost by setting optimal tax rates for different generating units. The lower-level decision maker is the grid operator who wants to minimize the total production cost through executing an economic dispatch while considering the tax levied by the government. The Stackelberg game model is finally formulated as a mixed integer linear program and solved by CPLEX. Case studies on a 10 unit system demonstrate the validity of the proposed model and method.

关键词

主从博弈 / 电力系统 / 碳排放税 / 混合整数线性规划.

引用本文

导出引用
梁易乐 , 黄少伟 , 张星 , 田芳 , 魏韡 , 刘峰 , 梅生伟. 基于主从博弈的碳排放税制定方法. 系统科学与数学, 2016, 36(8): 1055-1067. https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms12848
LIANG Yile , HUANG Shaowei , ZHANG Xing , TIAN Fang , WEI Wei , LIU Feng , MEI Shengwei. TAXING STRATEGIES FOR CARBON EMISSIONS BASED ON STACKELBERG GAME. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2016, 36(8): 1055-1067 https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms12848
中图分类号: 91A40   
PDF(599 KB)

Accesses

Citation

Detail

段落导航
相关文章

/