考虑随机需求和搭便车行为的双渠道供应链决策模型
Decision Model for Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Stochastic Demand and Free-Riding Behavior
针对由单一制造商和单一零售商构成的销售单一季节性产品的双渠道供应链, 本文研究了当两个渠道都面临随机需求且渠道间存在搭便车行为时, 供应链的最优决策问题以及协调机制. 研究表明, 供应链双方构成超模博弈, 纳什均衡解存在且唯一. 随着搭便车顾客比例的增加, 双方会降低售价和安全库存. 数值实验结果显示, 搭便车行为会损害零售商利益但在特定情况下会有利于制造商. 两部定价合同和限制最低售价的收益共享合同均能实现供应链协调. 在前者中, 零售商可以利用补偿值来激励制造商涨价以减少搭便车顾客数; 在后者中,零售商可以得到更低的批发价.
In this paper, a dual-channel supply chain composed by one manufacturer and one retailer is studied, in which an identical kind of seasonal product is sold over a finite time horizon. In this setting, a joint inventory and pricing decision is formulated and coordination mechanism is investigated when demand uncertainty in both channels and free-riding behavior between channels are considered. It is proved that the game is supermodular, which indicates that a unique nash equilibrium (NE) exists in the decentralized mode. For both the manufacturer and retailer, the optimal price and safety stock will be reduced as the number of free-riders increases. By our numerical experiment, It is shown that free-riding behavior always has harm to the retailer but under some circumstances will have benefit to the manufacturer. Both two-part tariff contract and minimum retail-price-constrained revenue-sharing contract can be used to coordinate this supply chain. In the former one, the profit loss made by free-riding can be reduced for the retailer if he promises to pay more transfer when the manufacturer raises price. In the latter one, the wholesale price will be lower.
双渠道供应链 / 随机需求 / 搭便车行为 / 超模博弈 / 两部定价合同 / 收益共享合同. {{custom_keyword}} /
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