以两阶段资金约束型供应链作为研究对象,以零售商运营资金不足作为前提条件,主要研究保兑仓模式下两级供应链期末返利契约的参数设计问题. 首先构建了面向资金约束下银行直接贷款时供应链期末返利契约模型,作为模式比较的基础.然后,定量化建立了保兑仓模式下期末返利契约协调模型, 该模型以制造商作为供应链的主导企业,承担全部的经营风险.引入银行作为第三方展开融资业务,以制造商信用作为基础,为零售商提供运营资金. 应用Stackelberg博弈模型求解出保兑仓模式下银行、制造商、零售商总体利益最大化下最优的订货量、批发价格以及期末增量单位返利数量值.通过运算发现, 在保兑仓模式下,制造商的最优批发价小于直接融资模式下的制造商批发价,由于制造商承担全部风险,致使零售商订货量增加,同时制造商利润上升,从而使整个供应链的利润随之上升.

In this paper, we consider a two-level finance-constrained supply chain of a manufacture and a retailer. This paper mainly concentrated on designing parameters in the final sales rebate contract (FSRC) under the condition of retailer's operating capital insufficiency. Firstly, we built the type of direct loans from banks under the restriction of final rebate contract model, as the basis of model comparison, then, we set up the confirming storehouse final quantitative rebate contract coordination model, the model take manufacturers as the leading enterprises of the supply chain, and bear all business risks. Then, we design bank financing business as the third party, make manufacturers credit as the foundation, to provide retailers operating funds. Applying Stackelberg game model to this two-level supply chain, the optimal order quantity, wholesale price and final increment rebate value in confirming warehouse mode are solved, which is made the manufacturers, retailers and bank overall benefit maximization. Through the numerical analysis, we find in confirming storehouse mode, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is less than the direct financing mode manufacturers wholesale prices, but expectations sales is far less than order quantity. Because the manufacturer bears all risks in traditional confirming warehouse, it is encourage retailers order too much, than lead to manufacturer's profit raise, so that the whole supply chain profit increase.