文章研究灾害发生后, 由政府和企业构成的救灾系统中救灾努力投入的决策问题, 并考虑了消费者行为对政企双方决策的影响. 文章首先假设政府和企业的救灾努力投入会影响企业的``慈善商誉'', 企业的救灾努力还会产生广告效应, 消费者需求受二者的共同影响, 同时考虑了参考价格效应对消费者行为的影响; 然后利用微分对策理论, 构建了政府和企业在分散式决策和集中式决策两种情形下的微分对策模型, 发现集中决策下政府和企业的最优救灾努力水平和系统的整体效用均高于分散式决策下的对应值; 最后, 设计了双边补贴策略对系统效用进行协调, 并通过算例分析对相关结论进行了验证, 为政企合作协同救灾提供了理论依据.

In this paper, we study decision-making about disaster relief efforts in a disaster relief system that consists of a government and an enterprise. Assuming that the enterprise's ``charity goodwil'' can be increased when disaster relief efforts are made by the government and enterprise. The enterprise's disaster relief efforts can also generate an advertising effect, and the enterprise's charity goodwill is jointly influenced by the two factors set forth above. We also take into account the impact of the reference price effect on consumer behaviour. First, we formulate the optimal decisions of the government and an enterprise in two different scenarios: Centralized decision and decentralized decision. The results show that the optimal disaster relief efforts of the government and enterprise, the utility of the system under the centralized decision are higher than those under the decentralized decision. Then we propose a two-way subsidy policy to coordinate the system utility. Finally, the model is analyzed through an example.