
溢出效应下多个竞争零售商的定价与服务决策
Optimal Pricing and Service Decisions of Multiple Competitive Retailers Under Spillover Effect
考虑分销渠道中多个零售商进行价格竞争的同时决定提供产品服务, 但服务存在着溢出效应, 研究它们在什么条件下才会提供服务, 设定何种水平的服务和零售价格以及二者的相互影响等问题. 运用博弈论构建了无服务、部分零售商提供服务和全部零售商提供服务等情形下的决策模型, 采用逆向法求解得到均衡结果, 找出了各零售商提供服务的条件. 结果表明, 零售商是否愿意提供服务、选择何种水平的服务和零售价格不仅取决于溢出效应的强弱, 还受服务竞争激烈程度的影响, 并且博弈均衡随零售商数量的变化而存在着差异. 研究结论为竞争环境下多个企业面临服务溢出时的服务策略选择和产品定价提供了参考.
Consider a distribution channel in which multiple retailers conducting price competition in the marketplace and meanwhile may provide service, which refers to all possible efforts they could exert to enhance demand. However, the service each retailer provides spill overs to its competitors. In this case, the questions addressed here are whether a retailer should provide such service and if so, how much? How can a retailer select a retail price to achieve the maximization of profit? And what is the interaction between price and service? To answer those issues, this paper utilizes game theory to develop decision-model in the setting where there is no service, part of the retailers provides service and all of them provide service, respectively. The equilibrium outcomes of each model are obtained by backward induction. Then, the condition under which a retailer has incentives to provide service is given, and the optimal levels of service and retail prices are compared. The results show that the retailers' optimal decisions and profits depend not only on the degree of spillover effect, but also on the degree of service competition. Moreover, the game equilibria vary with the changes of the number of retailers. Our findings provide multiple firms with choices on both pricing and service under the circumstances with competition and service spillover.
分销渠道管理 / 多零售商竞争 / 服务溢出效应 / 产品定价. {{custom_keyword}} /
/
〈 |
|
〉 |