雾霾治理限制性合作博弈与成本分摊研究
The Restricted Cooperative Game and Its Cost Allocation of Haze Control
文章从中央政府视角出发, 为打破省际雾霾协同治理的壁垒, 以城市为研 究对象, 根据各城市所在城市群的组织结构和地理结构, 建立具有两限制联盟结构的雾霾合作治理模型, 并以局中人对联盟结构的影响力为权重分配其合作收益.最后, 选取京津冀、中原、山东半岛城市群的9个城市进行两限制雾霾治理实证分析.结果表明: 与非合作相比, 两限制联盟结构的 合作能有效降低治理成本, 但是相较于没有两限制联盟结构的合作的成本更高, 说明多层级的组织结构和非相连的地理结构对有效合作起到了阻碍作用, 为达到更优的省际协同治理效果, 应减少组织层级结构和尽量使得合作的城市在地理结构上相连;按照各城市对联盟形成的影响力大小识别关键局中人.
From the perspective of the central government, this paper breaks the barriers of inter-provincial haze collaborative management, takes the city as the research object, considers the organizational structure and geographical structure of the urban agglomeration where the cities are located, establishes the haze cooperation governance model of the two-restricted alliance structure, and takes the influence of the bureaucrats on the alliance structure as the weight to allocate their cooperative income. Finally, nine cities in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Central Plains, and Shandong Peninsula urban agglomerations are selected for empirical analysis of governance strategies within and between urban agglomerations. The results show that the cooperation between the two restricted alliance structures can effectively reduce the cost of governance, but the cost of cooperation without the two-restricted alliance structure is higher, indicating that the multilevel organizational structure and disconnected geographical structure have hindered effective cooperation. In order to achieve better inter-provincial collaborative governance, the organizational hierarchy should be reduced and the cooperative cities should be connected geographically. According to the influence of each city on the formation of the alliance, the key players are identified.
雾霾治理 / / 合作博弈 / / 两限制联盟 / 城市群. {{custom_keyword}} /
/
〈 | 〉 |