基于不完全信息博弈的交通枢纽安保布防策略研究
Analysis of Security Policy in Transit Hub via Incomplete Information Games
近年来, 不同国家的交通枢纽多次受到恐怖袭击或其他形式的攻击造成大量人员的伤亡, 导致各国均投入大量人力物力发展交通枢纽中的安全措施. 文章以安保布防问题中攻击方与防御方信息的深度隐匿性为出发点, 研究以攻击者的攻击手段及目标不同、防御者的技术及资源不同形成各种类别的不对称信息博弈情形, 构造不完全信息的两人零和贝叶斯博弈模型, 以乘客伤亡人 数为主要风险评价指标, 分析攻击点选择以及安保布防的混合策略, 以及相关因素的敏感 程度, 为防御者的安保布防策略提供建议, 最终达到保护交通枢纽中乘客的目标.
In recent years, transit hubs in various countries of the world encountered some types of terrorist attack, therefore, these countries has put great deal of human and material resources into the task of securing transit hub. In this paper, we focus on the hidden information structure of this problem with different types of attackers and defenders, and then we build a incomplete information two person zero-sum Bayesian game model. With passenger casualties as the main risk measure, we study mixed strategies for attack location choice and check point selections. Finally, we analyze the impact of some major factors in this problem, providing suggestions for security strategies for defenders, and reach the goal of protecting passengers inside transit hubs.
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