构建了由一个出版商和一个零售商组成一个二级供应链, 以批发定价模型为基础, 分析了同步发行电子书和滞后发行电子书两种模式下出版商和零售商的决策行为. 文章首先基于消费者的最优选择分别构建了纸质书和电子书在两种模式下的需求函数, 然后引入一个斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型, 从理论上分 析了两种模式下决策双方的最优定价策略. 结果表明, 滞后发行电子书模式能给决策双方带来更大的利润;但是只有当消费者对电子书接受程度较低或较高时, 滞后发行电子书模式才能给消费者带来更高的福利;当消费者对电子书接受程度处于中等水平时, 消费者在同步发行电子书模式里则相对能获得更高的福利. 更进一步, 当消 费者对电子书的接受程度较高时, 随着其接受程度逐步增加, 出版商和零售商的利润均会增加, 同时消费者的福利也会增加. 文章的结果在一定程度上解释了当今中国出版业大多数出版商选择滞后发行电子书这一现象, 建议当今出版行业和整个社会应共同致力于提 高消费者对电子书的接受程度, 比如提供更完善的用户对电子书的阅读体验. 期望文章的研究能为当今出版业提供一定的参考借鉴意义.

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain which comprises a publisher and a retailer. Based on wholesale pricing model, we analyze optimal strategies of both players under two different ways that books are distributed—the publisher publishes an e-book with its print version simultaneously or publishes an e-book lagging behind its print version. Firstly, we construct demand functions of print book and e-book based on consumers' optimal choice respectively, then we analyze optimal pricing strategies of both players under two different ways that books are distributed by introducing a Stackelberg game. We find that the publisher publishes an e-book lagging behind its print version is better for the publisher and the retailer. However, it would be also better for the consumers only if consumers' acceptance for the e-book is relatively low or high. Moreover, when consumers' acceptance for the e-book is relatively high, the profits of the publisher and the retailer will increase with the acceptance, and so does consumers welfare. Our results provide an alternative explanation for the phenomena that most publisher prefer to publish an e-book lagging behind its print version in current China's publishing industry. The results suggest that the publishing industry and the society as a whole should work together on improving consumers' acceptance for e-book, such as providing better reading experience for the e-book consumers. We hope that our study can provide reference for the publishing industry.