研究了碳限额政策下一个制造商和两个零售商构成的二级供应链. 根据制造商差别定价或统一定价及两个零售商竞争或合作构建了4个博弈模型, 利用逆向归纳法得到了各个模型的均衡决策并进行了比较分析. 结果表明: 1) 制造商的利润在制造商差别定价两个零售商竞争时最大, 而在制造商统一定价两个零售商合作时最小. 2) 供应链的利润在制造商统一定价两个零售商合作时最大, 而在制造商差别定价两个零售商竞争时最小. 最后, 通过数值实验分析了碳限额对供应链成员利润的影响.

A two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers is studied under a carbon cap policy. Four game models are constructed according to the discriminatory pricing or the uniform pricing of the manufacturer and competition or cooperation between two retailers. The equilibrium decisions of each model are obtained by backward induction and {are also} compared. The results show that: 1) The manufacturer's profit is the biggest when the manufacturer chooses the discriminatory pricing and two retailers choose the competition, and is the smallest when the manufacturer choose the uniform pricing and two retailers choose the cooperation. 2) The supply chain's profit is the biggest when the manufacturer chooses the uniform pricing and two retailers choose the cooperation, and is the smallest when the manufacturer chooses the discriminatory pricing and two retailers choose the competition. Finally, the effect of carbon cap on the profits of the members of the supply chain is analyzed through the numerical experiments.