政府补贴新能源汽车的不同模式效果差异研究

郑小雪,李登峰,刘志,郑守红

系统科学与数学 ›› 2020, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (10) : 1821-1835.

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系统科学与数学 ›› 2020, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (10) : 1821-1835. DOI: 10.12341/jssms13983
论文

政府补贴新能源汽车的不同模式效果差异研究

    郑小雪1,2,李登峰1,刘志3,郑守红2
作者信息 +

Research on the Effects of Different Government Subsidy Modes for New Energy Vehicle

    ZHENG Xiaoxue 1,2 , LI Dengfeng1 , LIU Zhi3 , ZHENG Shouhong2
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摘要

目前, 新能源汽车市场处于发展初期, 为推动新能源汽车产业发展, 中国各地区政府主要采取两种补贴模式, 即补贴给消费者或者补贴给新能源汽车制造商.在消费者具有绿色偏好属性的情形下, 考虑政府以社会福利最大化为目标、制造商以利润最大化为目标, 建立政府与新能源汽车制造商的Stackelberg博弈模型, 分析比较政府补贴给制造商和补贴给消费者这两种补贴模式.进一步, 在补贴退坡情形下, 引入制造商技术创新策略, 研究制造商技术创新对于政府补贴的替代效应.研究结果表明: 两种补贴模式均存在合理的政府补贴范围, 两种补贴模式的环境影响、消费者剩余和社会福利无差异, 但政府补贴给制造商的模式直接增加了制造商的利润来源, 且有利于进一步降低新能源汽车终端售价, 刺激消费者的购买需求; 只有在新能源汽车市场接受度较低时, 制造商技术创新对于政府补贴有明显的替代作用, 补贴退坡能够有效激励制造商技术创新, 实现产业的技术升级.

Abstract

At present, the new energy vehicle market is in the early stage of development. In order to prosper the New Energy Vehicle (NEV) industry, local governments in China formulate two subsidy modes wherein the manufacturer or the consumer is subsidized. Given the consumers' green product preference, the governments aim at the maximization of social welfare and the manufacturer aims at the profit maximization. This paper establishes the Stackelberg game model between the government and NEV manufacturer and researches on the impact of the two modes on the optimal NEV production decisions and government subsidy policies. Then, we perform analyses on the comparison between the two subsidy modes. Furthermore, giving the gradual reduction of the subsidy on NEV, we incorporate the manufacturer's technical innovation effort into our model to explore the substitution effect of technical innovation effort on government subsidy. The results show that there exists a reasonable subsidy range for these two subsidy modes. Although the two subsidy modes have the same performance in the environmental impact, consumer surplus and the social welfare, the manufacturer can directly benefit from the manufacturer-subsidized model. That will lead to the increase of the consumers' purchase demand. Only with the low market acceptance of NEV, the manufacturer's technical innovation plays a significant role as the government subsidy does, which means that the subsidy reduction can effectively motivate the technical innovation and upgrade the industry technology.

关键词

新能源汽车 / 补贴政策 / 社会福利 / 环境影响 / Stackelberg博弈 / 补贴退坡.

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郑小雪 , 李登峰 , 刘志 , 郑守红. 政府补贴新能源汽车的不同模式效果差异研究. 系统科学与数学, 2020, 40(10): 1821-1835. https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms13983
ZHENG Xiaoxue , LI Dengfeng , LIU Zhi , ZHENG Shouhong. Research on the Effects of Different Government Subsidy Modes for New Energy Vehicle. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2020, 40(10): 1821-1835 https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms13983
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