在制造商和零售商组成的风险规避型闭环供应链系统中,考虑零售商资 金约束,引入制造商和零售商风险厌恶因子,运用博弈论和优化理论,分别研究了突发事 件不发生和突发事件发生两种情形下闭环供应链系统和零售商的最优订购量和最优回收 率,并设计了能实现供应链协调的收益共享-费用分担契约.研究结果表明: 回收渠道资 金,制造商和零售商的风险厌恶因子均对供应链系统和零售商的最优订购量,最优回收率, CVaR值,契约参数产生影响; 当突发事件发生时,并非所有的原契约都不能协调应对突发 事件,当一部分原契约满足一定条件时,原契约仍然可以协调应对突发事件; 当突发事件 发生时,重新设计的收益共享-费用分担契约可以实现整个闭环供应链协调.

In a closed-loop supply chain system composed of a risk-averse manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer, the retailer's capital constraint is considered, and the risk-averse factor is introduced. This paper studies the optimal order quantity and the optimal recovery rate of the closed-loop supply chain system and the retailer in the case of no emergency and the case of emergency, respectively. A revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract for supply chain coordination is designed. The results show that the optimal order quantity, optimal recovery rate, CVaR value and contract parameters of the supply chain are affected by the recovered channel funds and the risk-averse factors of the manufacturer and the retailer, and the original contract under no emergency events can still coordinate the supply chain under emergency events when certain conditions are met.