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供应链视角下主导型零售商的股权融资模型分析

王宇1,翟佳1,邓杰2   

  1. 1. 重庆理工大学管理学院, 重庆  400054; 2. 重庆工商大学会计学院,重庆  400067
  • 出版日期:2021-02-25 发布日期:2021-04-19

王宇,翟佳,邓杰. 供应链视角下主导型零售商的股权融资模型分析[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2021, 41(2): 466-480.

WANG Yu,ZHAI Jia, DENG Jie. Study on Equity Financing Model of Dominant Retailer on the Perspective of Supply Chain[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2021, 41(2): 466-480.

Study on Equity Financing Model of Dominant Retailer on the Perspective of Supply Chain

WANG Yu1 ,ZHAI Jia1 ,DENG Jie2   

  1. 1. School of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054; 2. School of Accountancy, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067
  • Online:2021-02-25 Published:2021-04-19

股权融资已成为企业独角兽成长之路的重要一环, 合理地制定融资和运营决策有助于企业健康快速发展. 文章构建了供应链中占主导地位的零售商的股权 融资模型, 研究股权融资对零售商跨越式发展的助推作用, 以及供应商博弈行为、投资者属性对零售商运营和融资的影响. 研究发现: 股权融资促进了高成长性零售商的快速成长, 并带动了供应商的发展; 供应商的博弈行为会抑制零售商的股权融资和市场开拓, 削弱零售商和供应商的利润, 双方应采取合作以避免陷入``囚徒困境''; 当供应商不参与博弈时, 追求利润的零售商原股东应选择财务投资者而非战略投资者, 以获得股权和利润的双重收益.

Equity financing has become an important part for the growth of unicorn enterprise, and its reasonable decision together with operation decision are conducive to the healthy and rapid development of the enterprise. This paper constructs a supply chain model with a supplier, a budget-constrained retailer and an equity investor, in which the retailer dominates the supply chain and may access to equity financing from either a financial equity investor or a strategic equity investor. Three detailed models which differ in equity investor or supplier's game behavior (SG for short) are considered to investigate the boosting effect of equity financing on the retailer's growth, as well as the influence of SG and investor attribute on the retailer's operation and financing decisions. Results show that equity financing greatly promotes the rapid development of high growth retailer and its supplier. Supply chain cooperate is necessary to avoid the ``prisoner's dilemma'' caused by the SG, which inhibits the retailer's equity financing and market development, and weakens the profits of both retailer and supplier. In addition, profit-seeking original shareholders of the retailer should choose financial investors rather than strategic investors in order to realize the dual benefits of equity and profit when the supplier does not participate in the game.

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