文章利用复杂适应系统的模拟方法, 在博弈数理模型的基础上, 构建了普通村民、富裕村民和政府多主体之间对于农村基础设施的 投资进行博弈的复杂系统模拟模型, 剖析农村基础设施投融资模式 单一的内在机理, 并在此基础上探讨扩大农村基础 设施投融资规模的合作机制. 研究发现: 由于``搭便车''心理的 存在, 不管是普通村民之间, 还是普通村民和富裕村民之间, 自发的基础设施投融资都会出现投资不足的困境; 如果有政府 参与, 非合作博弈的结果是基础设施的投资完全由政府承担; 在政府财政资金不足的情况下, 引入村民与基础设施投资总额 挂钩的投资合作机制, 可以增大基础设施投资规模, 同时提高 政府的绩效表现和提高村民的总体福利.

At present, the scale of investment and financing for rural infrastructure in China is relatively single. This paper aims to study the theoretical logic behind the dilemma of investment and financing for rural infrastructure and further explore effective investment and financing cooperation mechanisms. For this reason, this paper constructs game models of investment in rural infrastructure between ordinary villagers, between ordinary villagers and rich villagers, and between villagers and the government. Based on the mathematical game model, the investment in rural infrastructure between ordinary villagers, rich villagers and the government is simulated in a complex system by using the simulation method of multi-agent complex adaptive system. Through game simulation, this paper analyzes the internal mechanism of the single investment and financing mode of rural infrastructure, and on this basis discusses the cooperation mechanism to expand the scale of investment and financing of rural infrastructure. Through a series of studies, this paper draws the following main conclusions: Due to the existence of the``free rider" mentality of villagers, whether it is between ordinary villagers or between ordinary villagers and wealthy villagers, spontaneous infrastructure investment and financing will suffer from the predicament of insufficient investment. If the government is involved in the investment and financing of rural infrastructure, the result of the non-cooperative game between the government and the villagers is that the infrastructure investment is fully undertaken by the government. In the case of insufficient government financial funds, the introduction of investment rules linking villagers with the total amount of infrastructure investment can eliminate the ``free rider" behavior of villagers, greatly increase the sources of infrastructure investment, and alleviate the investment pressure of the government. At the same time, the performance of the government and the overall well-being of the villagers can be improved.