多个承运商协同完成农产品运输时, 后半程承运 商谎报保鲜水平造成冷链断链. 针对这一问题, 在事前支付与事后 支付两种方式下, 构建了集成服务商和承运商的主从博弈模型, 求 解出了最优保鲜水平和最优接单量, 据此研究了集成服务商的承运商 选择策略, 重点分析了谎报程度与服务价格的保鲜水平敏感性对最优 结果的影响. 结论表明, 前半程与后半程承运商承诺保鲜水平相等时, 集 成服务商选择分散决策的事后支付方式及事前支付方式下存在特定谎报范 围的承运商会优于承运商联盟, 否则选择承运商联盟. 在事前支付方 式下, 只要后半程承运商谎报的保鲜水平高于前半程, 那么也存在特定 的谎报范围使得冷链不会断链, 集成服务商仍应选择谎报保鲜水平的后 半程承运商.

The second half carrier lie about the level of fresh-keeping resulting in cold chain broken, when multiple carriers cooperate to complete agri-food transportation. In response to this problem, stackelberg game models between the integrated service provider and the carriers are developed for two different payment modes, namely pre-payment and post-payment, the optimal fresh-keeping level and order quantity are obtained. Based on this, the carrier selection strategy of the integrated service provider is studied, and the effects of lying degree and fresh-keeping sensitivity to service price on the optimal results are analyzed. The conclusion shows that when the first half and the second half of the carrier promise the same fresh-keeping level, the integration service provider's choice of the post-payment mode with decentralized decision and the pre-payment mode with specific scope of false declaration is better than the carrier alliance, otherwise, the carrier alliance is chosen. At the same time, under the pre-payment mode, as long as the fresh-keeping level of the second half carrier misreports higher than that of the first half carrier, the cold chain will not be broken, because of the existence of a specific misreporting coefficient, and the integrated service provider will still choose the second half carrier although who misreports.