针对企业绿色发展中政府、企业和高管之间的双重 委托代理关系,构建多任务的双重委托代理模型,得到政府激励 企业节能减排、企业激励高管兼顾生产和节能减排两项任务的最 优契约形式,通过数理推导和数值仿真相结合的方法分析各因素对 企业对高管的最优激励强度、企业对高管的相对激励强度和政府对 企业的最优激励强度的影响.结果表明,两项任务间的可替代程度、 高管付出努力的成本系数、生产任务方差、节能减排任务方差、高管风险 偏好都会影响最优激励契约的设计.两项任务间的可替代程度会直接和间接 影响企业对高管的相对激励强度、政府对企业的最优激励强度,两项任务的方 差比值会间接影响企业对高管的相对激励强度,而企业对高管的相对激励强度 会间接影响企业对高管的最优激励强度.

Aiming at the principal-agent-client relationship among the government, enterprises and senior executives in the green development of enterprises, the principal-agent-client model of multi-tasks is constructed to explore the optimal incentive contract in which the government encourages enterprises to save energy and reduce emissions and enterprises encourage senior executives to take production, energy conservation and emission reduction into account. Mathematical derivation and numerical simulation are jointly applied to analyze the influencing factors of the optimal incentive intensity of enterprises to senior executives, the relative incentive intensity of enterprises to senior executives and the optimal incentive intensity of governments to enterprises. The results show that the degree of substitutability between two tasks, the cost coefficient of senior executives' efforts, variance of production tasks, variance of energy conservation and emission reduction tasks, and risk preference of senior executives have the effect on the design of the optimal incentive contract. The relative incentive intensity of enterprises to senior executives and optimal incentive intensity of governments to enterprises are directly and indirectly affected by the degree of substitutability between two tasks. The ratio of the variance of the two tasks indirectly plays effect on the relative incentive intensity of enterprises to senior executives that indirectly plays impact on the optimal incentive intensity of enterprises to senior executives.