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基于不平等厌恶的易变质品供应链合作的利他收益分配

冯海荣1,周永务2,曾银莲3,钱茜1   

  1. 1. 四川师范大学商学院, 成都 610101; 2. 华南理工大学工商管理学院, 广州 510641; 3. 南方科技 大学商学院信息系统与管理工程系, 深圳 518055
  • 出版日期:2021-09-25 发布日期:2021-11-25

冯海荣, 周永务, 曾银莲, 钱茜. 基于不平等厌恶的易变质品供应链合作的利他收益分配[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2021, 41(9): 2460-2476.

FENG Hairong, ZHOU Yongwu, ZENG Yinlian, QIAN Qian. Altruistic Profit Allocation for Inventory Systems with Deteriorating Items-Based on Unequal Aversion Model[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2021, 41(9): 2460-2476.

Altruistic Profit Allocation for Inventory Systems with Deteriorating Items-Based on Unequal Aversion Model

FENG Hairong1 ,ZHOU Yongwu2 ,ZENG Yinlian3 , QIAN Qian1   

  1. 1. School of Business, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu 610101; 2. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641; 3. Department of Information Systems and Management Engineering, College of Business, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen 518055
  • Online:2021-09-25 Published:2021-11-25
在控制成本 和碳减排的双重压力下, 供应链企业间的横 向合作是一种双赢的战略模式. 针对多零售商和单供应商组成的二阶易变质品 供应链, 研究碳交易机制下多零售商协同采购的订货决策问题. 应用合作博弈 理论将多零售商协同采购后的收益分配问题构建成相应的收益分配博弈, 证明 了博弈满足超可加性, 多零售商的协同合作带来易变质品供应链系统收益的增加 以及碳排放量的减少. 考虑个体决策时具有``他涉''的社会偏好, 定义零售 商可接受的碳排放权最大转让数量, 基于不平等厌恶模型定义潜在贡献者和搭便车者并求解潜在贡献者的占优策略, 即何时贡献以及贡献多少, 设计属于博弈核心的利他收益分配方案. 研究发现, 潜在贡献者在大联盟内以低于市场价格转让碳排放权而给其他零售商带来消费者剩余的慷慨行为是一种利他行为, 这不需要付出多少代价, 但由此可以获得良好声誉; 考虑社会偏好动机的利他收益分配方案有利于供应链系统产生高水平的合作行为, 协同合作将具有可持续性.
With increasing pressure to reduce cost as well as carbon footprint for firms, horizontal cooperation between two or more dependent or independent firms may be a win-win strategy. In this paper, we investigate collaborative procurement problem among retailers in a supply chain with deteriorating items under the carbon cap-and-trade policy. We first model the collaborative procurement system under the carbon cap-and-trade policy, and then identify the optimal joint ordering strategy. Then we formulate the profit allocation game for the collaborative procurement problem. It is proved that the corresponding game is superadditive. Moreover, we show that collaborative procurement among retailers under the carbon cap-and-trade policy not only increases the total profit but also reduces the total amount of carbon emissions. Since agents may have other-regarding preferences, we further design an altruistic profit allocation rule. We calculate the maximum voluntary payment for retailers who transfer out the carbon allowance, categorize free-riders and contributors by employing inequality aversion model, and develop the dominant strategy for contributors. We further show that the proposed altruistic profit allocation rule also lies in the core of the corresponding profit allocation game. The results show that the retailers with altruistic behavior will transfer out the carbon allowance at a price below the carbon trading market price, which bring additional consumer surplus to other retailers. This in turn will enhance social status and reputation for retailers with altruistic behavior, without incurring significant cost. All in all, cooperation can be reinforced by members' altruistic behavior over the long term by employing the proposed altruistic profit allocation to distribute the additional profit.
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