合作博弈的比例分离解及其在区域经济一体化中的应用

doi:10.12341/jssms20548T

系统科学与数学 ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (4): 791-801.DOI: 10.12341/jssms20548T

合作博弈的比例分离解及其在区域经济一体化中的应用

张广, 何楠

上海理工大学管理学院上海 200093

收稿日期:2020-12-31 修回日期:2021-04-29 出版日期:2022-04-25 发布日期:2022-06-18
通讯作者: 张广,Email:g.zhang@usst.edu.cn.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金(71901145),上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2019EGL010)资助课题.

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张广, 何楠. 合作博弈的比例分离解及其在区域经济一体化中的应用[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2022, 42(4): 791-801.

ZHANG Guang, HE Nan. The Proportional Split-Off Solution for Cooperative Games and Application in Regional Economic Integration[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2022, 42(4): 791-801.

The Proportional Split-Off Solution for Cooperative Games and Application in Regional Economic Integration

ZHANG Guang, HE Nan

Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093

Received:2020-12-31 Revised:2021-04-29 Online:2022-04-25 Published:2022-06-18

关键词： 合作博弈, 比例分离解, 公理刻画, 区域经济

This paper studies cooperative games and provides a new solution concept called proportional split-off solution based on proportional rule and the forming procedure for a coalition. By applying a given weighted vector and based on decrease of profits, a suitable distributed partition of the grand coalition is obtained. And then, depending on coalitions’ ordering in partition, the marginal contribution of the coalitions is determined by using proportional rule. Later on, three axiomatizations of the proportional split-off solution are proposed by adopting consistency. Finally, application of the new solution is studied on the regional economic situation. By building a synergy game, we analyze the contributions and program of the regional economic synergistic development in Yangtze River Delta.

Key words: Cooperative game, proportional split-off solution, axiomatization, regional economic

MR(2010)主题分类:

91A12
91A80

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