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突发事件下抗疫物资供应链的激励机制随机演化博弈模型

王挺1, 王雷2   

  1. 1. 中国刑事警察学院警察技能战术训练部 沈阳 110035;
    2. 中国刑事 警察学院禁毒与治安学院 沈阳 110035
  • 收稿日期:2021-09-10 修回日期:2021-12-09 出版日期:2022-04-25 发布日期:2022-06-18
  • 通讯作者: 王雷,Email:leonwang521@126.com.
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划项目(2018YFC0807500),国家自然科学基金项目(71974067),辽宁省教育厅2021年度科学研究经费项目(LJKR0029)资助课题.

王挺, 王雷. 突发事件下抗疫物资供应链的激励机制随机演化博弈模型[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2022, 42(4): 965-977.

WANG Ting, WANG Lei. The Random Evolutionary Game Model of Incentive Mechanism for Anti-Epidemic Supplies Supply Chain Based on Emergency Events[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2022, 42(4): 965-977.

The Random Evolutionary Game Model of Incentive Mechanism for Anti-Epidemic Supplies Supply Chain Based on Emergency Events

WANG Ting1, WANG Lei2   

  1. 1. Department of Police Skills and Tactics Training, Criminal Investigation Police University of China, Shenyang 110035;
    2. School of Narcotics Control and Public Order Studies, Criminal Investigation Police University of China, Shenyang 110035
  • Received:2021-09-10 Revised:2021-12-09 Online:2022-04-25 Published:2022-06-18
Public health emergencies are characterized by complex causes, widespread and serious harm, which brings great uncertainty to the production and supply of anti-epidemic materials. The negative production strategy adopted by production enterprises under consideration of internal and external risks such as production environment, market profit and employee safety, it will affect the profit of other enterprises in the supply chain, and even affect the guarantee of material supply. The authors of this paper supply operating decisions to the disease resistant materials manufacturing enterprises, by the method of the government intervention to build stochastic evolution model based on production strategies of disease resistant materials production enterprises, calculate the enterprise production supply strategy equilibrium results separately, in the two cases where random factors and expected returns dominate. Under static government accountability mechanism, combined with dynamic rewards and punishment mechanism, the regulation effect of different degree of negative production enterprises is discussed. The results show that the regulation effect of static accountability mechanism on negative production behavior is related to the degree of “profit-driven”, which can effectively stimulate enterprises with high profitability to switch to “active production”. While the effect of dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is not related to the above degree, which can effectively avoid the phenomenon that static accountability mechanism is ineffective in motivating enterprises with low profit and negative production behavior.

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