Public health emergencies are characterized by complex causes, widespread and serious harm, which brings great uncertainty to the production and supply of anti-epidemic materials. The negative production strategy adopted by production enterprises under consideration of internal and external risks such as production environment, market profit and employee safety, it will affect the profit of other enterprises in the supply chain, and even affect the guarantee of material supply. The authors of this paper supply operating decisions to the disease resistant materials manufacturing enterprises, by the method of the government intervention to build stochastic evolution model based on production strategies of disease resistant materials production enterprises, calculate the enterprise production supply strategy equilibrium results separately, in the two cases where random factors and expected returns dominate. Under static government accountability mechanism, combined with dynamic rewards and punishment mechanism, the regulation effect of different degree of negative production enterprises is discussed. The results show that the regulation effect of static accountability mechanism on negative production behavior is related to the degree of “profit-driven”, which can effectively stimulate enterprises with high profitability to switch to “active production”. While the effect of dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is not related to the above degree, which can effectively avoid the phenomenon that static accountability mechanism is ineffective in motivating enterprises with low profit and negative production behavior.