Abstract
There exist a risk of breakdown in the real bargaining games. Muthoo developed an alternating-offer bargaining with a risk of breakdown under the assumption that players are rational. Lots of works on psychology show that decision makers are loss averse. To investigate the impact of loss aversion for players on bargaining game with a risk of breakdown, Muthoo’s alternating offers bargaining game is reconsidered. First, the highest rejected offer in the past is regarded as reference points, which makes the payoffs and equilibrium strategies depend on the history of bargaining. Then, a subgame perfect equilibrium is constructed, which depends on the history of bargaining through the current reference points. And its uniqueness is shown under assumptions: Strategies depending only on the current reference points, immediate acceptance of equilibrium offers and indifference between acceptance and rejection of such offers. Finally, a comparative statics of loss aversion coefficients is performed, and the convergence of the subgame perfect equilibrium for the probability of breakdown tending to zero is analyze. It is shown that a player benefits from loss aversion of the opponent and is hurt by loss aversion of himself.
关键词
损失厌恶 /
Muthoo交替出价谈判博弈 /
子博弈完美均衡 /
参考点
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Key words
Loss aversion /
Muthoo alternating offers bargaining game /
subgame perfect equilibrium /
reference points
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中图分类号：
00A06
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参考文献
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金(71971218,71671188)资助课题.
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