中图分类号:
91A10
91A12
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参考文献
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[8] Herings P, Laan G, Talman D. The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, 62(1):77-92.
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[10] 单而芳,曾晗,韩佳玉.无圈超图对策上的有效平均树解.系统工程理论与实践, 2021, 41(3):781-789.(Shan E F, Zeng H, Han J Y. The efficient average tree solution for cycle-free hypergraph games. System Engineering-Theory&Practice, 2021, 41(3):781-789.)
[11] 吕璞,马可心.基于相对风险分担的集群供应链协同创新收益分配机制研究.运筹与管理, 2020, 29(9):115-123.(Lü P, Ma K X. Revenue allocation for cooperative innovation based on relative risk in cluster supply chain. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(9):115-123.)
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脚注
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基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372195),北京市社会科学基金一般项目(17GLB014),北京化工大学一流学科建设专项资金资助(XK1802-5),北京化工大学基地项目(G-JD202002)资助课题.
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