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碳标签制度下基于AT解的三级供应链收益分配研究

吴军1, 巴依勒1, 郝伟怡2, 岳利媛1   

  1. 1. 北京化工大学经济管理学院 北京 100029;
    2. 大唐实创(北京)投资 有限公司 北京 100191
  • 收稿日期:2021-10-13 修回日期:2021-11-29 出版日期:2022-04-25 发布日期:2022-06-18
  • 通讯作者: 岳利媛,Email:2020200853@buct.edu.cn.
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372195),北京市社会科学基金一般项目(17GLB014),北京化工大学一流学科建设专项资金资助(XK1802-5),北京化工大学基地项目(G-JD202002)资助课题.

吴军, 巴依勒, 郝伟怡, 岳利媛. 碳标签制度下基于AT解的三级供应链收益分配研究[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2022, 42(4): 955-964.

WU Jun, BA Yile, HAO Weiyi, YUE Liyuan. Revenue Allocation of Three-Level Supply Chain Based on AT Solution Under Carbon Labeling System[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2022, 42(4): 955-964.

Revenue Allocation of Three-Level Supply Chain Based on AT Solution Under Carbon Labeling System

WU Jun1, BA Yile1, HAO Weiyi2, YUE Liyuan1   

  1. 1. College of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Chemical Techonology, Beijing 100029;
    2. Datang Carera (Beijing) Investment Co. Ltd, Beijing 100191
  • Received:2021-10-13 Revised:2021-11-29 Online:2022-04-25 Published:2022-06-18
It is of great significance to study the issue of supply chain revenue allocation under the carbon labeling system. This paper takes the three-level supply chain with restricted alliance structure as the research object, analyzes the four possible cooperative emission reduction alliance situations that may be formed by the three-level supply chain composed of supplier, manufacturer, and retailer, and uses AT solution and Shapley value distribute the revenue of cooperative emissions reduction. The results show that the total revenue of the supply chain is the largest when the participants in the supply chain make centralized decisions, and the distribution of revenue using the AT solution takes into account the role of the participants in the supply chain structure. Compared with the Shapley value, the distribution result is more reasonable and effective.

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